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PARTIES BELOW
Appellee/Plaintiff Ray Hunting ("Hunting") sued Appellant/Defendant Pipe
Renewal Service, LLC, a Limited Liability Company, in Eighth Judicial District Court, in
Uintah County, State of Utah, seeking an eviction and to recover alleged amounts due in a
tenancy dispute. After trial, Judge John R Anderson entered judgment in favor of
Plaintiff/Appellee and awarded Plaintiff Hunting, as the prevailing party, $88,174.50 in
unpaid rent plus costs.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to review the an order on summary judgement pursuant
to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)0') a n d § 78-2a-3(2)(j); to wit, appeal from a District
Court decision dismissing action on motion for summary judgment.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY NOT REQUIRING THE
PLAINTIFF TO JOIN NECESSARY AND ESSENTIAL PARTIES.
A district court's interpretation of rule governing joinder is a question of law

reviewed for correctness. Smith v. Osguthorpe, 58 P.3d 854 (Utah Ct. App. 2002); see
also Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah 1990) (interpreting "shall be
joined" in joinder rule as mandatory). Trial courts determination regarding joinder of a
party is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Ludlow v. Salt Lake County Bd. of Adjustment,
893 P.2d 1101 (Utah 1995). This issue was preserved for appeal. (R. 377; R. 481-482; R.
577-580; R. 715-717).
II.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DESPITE ISSUES OF MATERIAL
FACT CONCERNING WHETHER PLAINTIFF HAD CONVEYED HIS RIGHT
TO POSSESSION.
On an appeal from an order granting summary judgment, the Court of Appeals

reviews the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Equitable Life &
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Utah App. 1993). Whether the trial court

properly granted summary judgment as a matter of law, the Court of Appeals gives no
deference to the trial court's view of law, but reviews it for correctness. Utah State Coal.
ofSr. Citizens v. Utah Power and Light Co., 116 P.2d 632, 634 (Utah 1989). This issue
was preserved for appeal. (R.251-279; R. 369-370; R. 371-388).
III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT AWARDED PLAINTIFF $88.000.00
INSTEAD OF NOMINAL DAMAGES. SINCE RENT AFTER THE SERVING
OF A THREE-DAY NOTICE IS "DAMAGES" PURSUANT TO THE
UNLAWFUL DETAINER STATUTE.
Matters of statutory construction are questions of law that are reviewed for

correctness. Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 661 (Utah 1997) (stating
"Matters of statutory construction are questions of law that are reviewed for correctness").
This issue was preserved for appeal. (R. 600-601; R. 606; R. 714, 717).

-2-

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I. Nature of the Case
This is an appeal in an unlawful detainer action from afinaljudgment or decree in
the Eighth District Court of Uintah County, Utah. Plaintiff Ray Fvnting sued Defendant Pipe
b

v. -' K t. i..

* *t*

.i

damages. (R. 2-11) Plaintiffs motion for summary judgement was granted in part,
reserving only the issue of damages for a later hearing. Defendant petitioned (lie court for
reconsideratioii of the evidence presented in oppositioii to I Inluting's motion, ,-.:\: at:: - :
necessai y parties she

* 3-380; R 478 482)

I 'v 'o n IOI ith

]

•' •

;

entertained oral arguments on Defendant's motioiis, but nevertheless affirmed its earlier
ruling. Again, the trial court did not address the issue of damages. Next, Defendant filed
a motion 'for summary judgemen: • • ,he issue of damages wl n ::!: I was i iltii i lately clei ned.
1 1 )e coi 11: t' s fi t !a 1 oi dei v ' 1 i i : 1 i

•

^ r • r;11e findings of fact or

conclusions of law, awarded Plaintiff a judgment against Defendant

;e total sum of

$88,174.50, which was designated as unpaid rent from September of 2005 through
Decei i iber< >f 2006 ii tl u , .u \ i< i n il :)f S 8 8 , 0 0 :.) 0 0 , ait :i :l cc i >ts i i 1 I; u ' ai i u )i n it of $1 7 4 50. (R.'
817-822). I he issue of the eviction of the Defendant, having become moot, was not at
issue at the time of the final order.
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II. Course of Proceedings Below
On September 16, 2005, Plaintiff caused a "Three Day Notice to Pay Rent or
Vacate" to be rendered upon the Defendant. On October 19, 2005, Plaintiff filed a
Complaint against PRS LLC but named it as a Utah Corporation. (R. 1). On June 5, 2006,
Hunting filed an Amended Complaint which made clear that he intended to sue Pipe
Renewal Service, LLC. (R. 59)
On September 21, 2006, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary of Judgment. (R.
138-140). On September 22, 2006, Defendant filed a motion which the court treated as a
motion for summary judgement. (R. 180-181). On November 1, 2006, the Court entered
its Ruling and Order partially granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and
denying Defendants motion. (R. 340-343). The Court reserved the issue of Plaintiffs
damages for a future hearing.
On November 14, 2006, Defendant filed a Motion to Reconsider the Court's
November 1st Ruling and Order. (R. 369-370) After receipt of briefing from the parties'
counsel, the Court entertained oral argument regarding Defendant's Motion to Reconsider
on January 30, 2007. On Febmary 1, 2007, the Court issued its written Ruling and Order
in which it denied Defendant's Motion to Reconsider and affirmed the Court's partial
summary judgment in Plaintiffs favor as determined in the November 1, 2006, Ruling
and Order. (R. 594-599).
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On April 6, 2007, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of
Damages. (R. 600-601)

After receiving briefing from both parlies' u-uiht i. •••-. r v n r t

issued its Rulit i.g dated May 3 1 200 / , < lenyii ig Defendai it's f 1 : tioi I f< in Si n i n in; try
Jud j m - " " <!*. / o v - 7 / 1 ) . \j\i M a y 3 , 2 0 0 7 , Plaintiff filed his M o t i o n to A w a r d Dairiages
and for Entry of Final Judgment. \ K 629-635) O:.- \fa\ 1 "\ 2007. Defendant filed
Motions to Strike the Affidavits rI -< • -uining and r

\

, • i.

.•

_? 726; R

7^1-^2).
On July 2, 2007, the Court entered its ruling, granting, in part, Plaintiffs Motion to
Award Damages and for Entr\ of Fin;i! Judgment and granting, in part, Defendant's
Mofon^ to
t

MUK.J

\:\ , -i

/ t

. t was awardeo a judgment against [ '•_. _»>

M ^ *

•

•.'--,

nbei oi JuwS

through December of 2006 iii the amount of $88,000.00, and costs in the amount of
$174.50. The cvnri did -.ot * lt. 1 "damages" on the basis of Perkins v. Spencer. (Id. at
819-820).

5

III. Statement of Facts
Plaintiff Ray Hunting is an individual who resides in Uintah County, State of
Utah. Defendant is a Utah Limited Liability Company engaged in the business of
maintenance, construction, handling, restoration, repairs, purchase and sale of oil field
production equipment and other related activities. (R. 1; R. 720).
Defendant and his wife Marilyn Hunting (collectively the "Huntings") are the
owners of the real property known as 5500 East 5750 South, Vernal, Uintah County, State
of Utah (hereinafter "Premises"), consisting of approximately 20.5 acres of land. (R. 1).
On December 19, 1991, the Huntings and Pipe Renewal Service Inc. (hereinafter
"PRS Inc.") entered into a written lease agreement for the purpose of reducing their prior
verbal lease agreement to writing wherein Huntings are named "Owner" and PRS Inc. is
named "Tenant." (R. 182-186, 192-193; R. 719-720). At the time of the initiation of the
lease, the leasehold originally furnished by Mr. Hunting consisted of the shell of the main
warehouse building and farmland. (R. 756-768). The Lease Agreement has a term of
fifty (50) years. (R. 192-195; R. 384-388). PRS Inc. currently occupies, and has
continuously occupied the Premises since the mid 1980s. (R. 382-383). In reliance upon
the 50 year term of the lease PRS Inc. has made substantial improvements to the
Premises. (R. 382-383).
At no time during the more than twenty year period that PRS Inc. has occupied the
Premises pursuant to the lease agreement has it breached the terms of either the verbal

-6-

lease agreement or the written Lease Agreement, ^iv. It -i, R. 252; R. S72 p *" >
time have the Huntings initiated litigation to challenge the validity ol

«_I..I.U

me ^

lease agreement or the written Lease Agreement or of :
252)

•'

-

- <

,,1
•

.• •

R.

die agreed upon sin i i of

$.\u00.00 outlined in the Agreement. (K. 154).
In 2004, PRS Inc. created additional business entities to better serve its growing
needs. One such entity was Defend^: . ; a^ Kcae^ a. :•

\ •..

f

^

*e

limited liability coi i ipat ly sei ved as a i t tai lagerial entity overseeing the day-to-day uccvi:> ai
the various business entities' operations. Accordingly it paid many of PRS Inc.'s bills
including rent to the Huntings. (R. 71 ( )-~^ 1 *

r

*or approximately 18 months said practice

continued withoi it objection In »iii i In I Itiittmui |K
pa\ u nil MI

A,

• | >| >

M N* notice fa

IIIIIII."I«>

*1111i • a Im
' \ hi' illn i In * I, i iimc ft on i Tipe Renewal Service, LLC" rather

than "Pipe Renewal Service, [tie1 was ever sent, t i- S"~2 p ";• Then >•;< August 15, 2005,
Hunting sent Defenda r.t - ,^.licc of rent increase. (R r-x The notice stated thai i'i.ma f
knew not waem "ic ajau. .:
^ »

< had no contract w ilh I ivfetitlaiil and Hi it munlhlc rent

^ n.Msod ::oni ^2,000.00 to $7,500.00 per month. (R. 6).
During the course of the proceedings Plaintiff motioned the tv\:i] r Mirt tV

summary judgmer^ -'R

11<

3M0) v; defense, Detenu ca

between, the Mm mi . «M •

:

\
•

-ca ^.- . ^ u \ -

n!

- • \>^ubbiun pi\>r--|y

flow ed froi n the tenant- not Plaintiff (R. 251-279). However, ihe tn.a v.'uut ^onuudol
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that the LLC defendant had not responded by affidavit and that it was therefore justified
in granting summary judgement in favor of Plaintiff, reserving the issue of damages for a
later hearing. (R. 340-343).
In response to the trial court's ruling, the Defendant filed a motion for
reconsideration on several grounds. (R. 369-370). One such reason was that Defendant
failed to join the PRS Inc. as a necessary party. (R. 377). The Defendant also urged the
court to modify its ruling on the basis that the lease agreement meet the requirements for
a self-authenticating document under Rule 902(8) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
(R. 373-374). After the parties were given an opportunity to appropriately brief the issues,
the court entered a ruling in which it set the motion for a hearing and stated "the Court is
prepared to order PRS, Inc. be joined", and that it would do so unless "the parties can
adequately explain why PRS, Inc. should not be joined." (R. 577-580). At the hearing
Defendant asserted that the PRS, Inc. and others were necessary parties. (R. 872 p. 5, p.
11). The Plaintiff asserted that Defendant was the only necessary party and presented
four cases for the first time at the hearing, which Plaintiff believed supported this
assertion. (R. 872 p. 15).
With only a brief opportunity to glance over the cases during the hearing,
Defendant asserted that all four cases were inapplicable as they dealt with situations
where the additional parties entered the premises after the defendant had been served with
the three day notice. (R. 872 pp. 27-28). The court took the issue under advisement and
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uhiiiuh'ly sided with the Defendant. (R. 594-599). ... ._ k_.L ig the trial court
distinguished Plaintiffs cases and stated that the "Court is still not convinced t hat PRS,
Inc. is not a necessary party." (Id.) Nevertheless, still ilie
a party noi di<l il le^iine I he I'hinlill h> JJIKIHI lis enmplaim. ^u.)
The issue of damages remained outstanding, but the issue of eviction had become
moot by Mr Ifiinting's own admission as the PRS LLC had vacated the property. I he
* e r -\ : ' ? |Vr " the

Court refused to enter an order of restitution on the hnsi
righi •*
jiac|

noj.

•*.).-•;•?

|3een

ma(

je

a

N w ho were occupy me the property, but who

party to any preceding. (i J.,« Altei entertaining three additional

motions the court entered a final judgement in favor for the plaintit;
$88,174.50,

WIIKII

Deeeinlit'i nf

;

w iu;..i sum of

was calculated as unpaid iuil (mm \\ pit i• • I•*.-r ot 'no 1 lliinmiji

.'I.IIO m

flu- .miinuil of $88,000.00, and costs in the amount of $174.50.

(R. 819-822).
The trial court held that rent was not damages and that, based -. w Perkins v.
Spencer, 243 I'.JM 44(>|Ulah I'ix?). (ho I"" 1, 1111 f i TI voi»; nol enlilled mudiiiagis. ilie Court
stated tlit• follow ing, as set forth in the record, as the basis therefore:
"On this point, the Cour tis Persuaded by Perkins v. Spencer, 243 P.2d 446
i'l TA J f 1 ^52). v\ Mich clearly addresses the issue of whether treble damages
*>T :M;i.jv I'd detainer are appropriate when a non-party to the suit enjoys
possession of the subject property. While the cases are distingushable on
some factual points, the fact of the matter remains that
'so long as [PRS, Inc.] remained in possession, r is dill ei.l: to see
how [Mr. Hunting] could be damaged ;\\ the la.! !i:at j PRS, ine ]
remained there. Even il [she i IX ] h,-, ; io\ed, j_\lr. Hunting] would
-9.

have no right of possession of the premises as against [the
corporation]. [Mr. Hunting], therefore, suffered no actual damage."'
See Id. at 449.
(R. 819-820).
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s- The tria.

..:

*

•

'••

" •

01 hianiuil as he docs

not ciijit" the i ii'Iil \ pI" possession ai id has tailed to join necessary parties. The right to use
leased premises during the term specified iii the lease was transferred from M-

l

to the tenant and the right o r * H H persons to enter the premises does not depe

,

F-:

al<» i:

. «..*:n\:

:

v* -

li :• : :

•

;

^.,nT:n':

;uiiig>> and Vl\5 mc.

*:*. : • ' ndavii ui the chief officer of the Corporation should have been sufficient

to create a genuine issue as to a material fact.
Additionally, the trial coi u t si toiild have required tl le joindei of all ei itities
oc\ ' . • . : . .
possession o( the

i \\ hcic the Plaintiff sought to recover
:M MXT*

v

. I he obligation to join necessary parties rests firmly with the

Plaintiff If the court's ruling is to be construed as holding that said parties could ;HK lie
joined, the court should have conducted the propet two step at u ilysis.
= «preied Utah's forcible entry and detainer statute
on the issue of damages. 11ic coint correctly held ihai damages How from the right of
possession and that the Plaintiff does not enjow th
1 leld that i ei it accrued r v r

•

IL

;*I pov^siw.*
=

•:*

-\ ^ 1v

• . . ^ .!j;r. J . . ^ .

II ic coi n t si 101 ild 1 lave held that the Plaintiff, if he was entitled to damages at all, was
entitled only to nominal damages.

„1I_

ARGUMENT

I.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY NOT REQUIRING THE
PLAINTIFF TO JOIN NECESSARY AND ESSENTIAL PARTIES

The trial court improperly granted summary judgement in Plaintiffs action to
recover possession and damages under Utah's unlawful detainer statute. Among those
occupying and claiming an interest in the property before and during the litigation is the
Corporation Pipe Renewal Services Management, Inc. (herein after "PRS Inc." and
formerly known as "Pipe Renewal Service, Inc."). The Court's ruling on the merits of
this case without PRS Inc. as a party to the litigation is improper. Reader v. District
Court, 98 Utah 1, 94 P.2d 858 (1939)(stating " The failure of the court to obtain
jurisdiction over one of the indispensable parties rendered the judgment as to all of them
void.").
Utah case law clearly states that if the object of the action is to recover possession
or use of property, then parties who are in possession and claim an interest in the property
are necessary and indispensable parties to the action. Bonneville Tower v. Thompson
Michie Assoc., 728 P.2d 1017, 1019 (Utah 1986) (stating "If, as set forth in the prayer of
plaintiffs complaint, an objective of the action is to recover possession or use of the
property, then the parties who are in possession and claim ownership are necessary and

-12-

indi • vnsable parties to the action"), sec also Massachusetts and Southern

Construction

Co. v. Cane Creek Township, 155 U.S. 283, 15 S.Ct. 91 V) F .Fd. 152 (1894).
Rule 19 of the I J*;!,: •• !'^ o

sitnatio

r r

^

; f ; \ . J u r e n l s o ntf :- : -^ (u [ i i e u ' l l l ihi t * | v tit

-i.

'••

' «•

Absence complete relief cannot

be accorded." Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 19(a). Rule 19 further states that the "pleader," here
the Plaintiff I luiittiig, "shall state" the names of those parties and "state the reasons why
they r.re no!

IUI^O

; ..: ,

tfr\

!

•> 78-36-7 airports a contention that

Plaintiff was not obligated to join other parties occupying the premises despite the
requirements of Rule 19. The statute actually states,
No person other than the tenant of the premises, a lease
signer, and subtenant if there is one in the actual occupation
of the premises when the action is commenced, shall be made
a party defendant in the proceeding, . . ., nor shall atly
proceeding abate, nor the plaintiff be nonsuited, for the
nonjoinder of any person vvl ^ might have been made a party
defendant; but when it appears that my of the parties served
with process or appearing in the proceedings are guilty,
judgment shall be rendered against those parties.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-7(1) (1953, as amended).
In light of the facts of this case that there is another entity, i'K •*• . -K . :; r >*. ! **! •
has a written lease agreement I*-i\v. t*-L •••: ^
last .?.(> \cais and lv.it" i n-'lil

.

*••••.

= ^ s iui me

• possession, a!i oi vvlm.ii is known U; liic Plaintiff,

Section 78-36-7 cannot b e interpreted in a sense that circumvents R n \ ! ° -\\\ \ the case
-13-

law cited above regarding the joinder of parties with a right of possession where the issue
is recovery of possession. The notion that the Court should not have granted summary
judgment without the joinder of PRS Inc. and without making a determination of
Defendant's right of possession in light of the lease agreement and in light of PRS Inc.'s
right of possession is not inconsistent with Section 78-36-7.
Indeed, the trial court recognized the joinder issue and in many respects agreed
with the Defendant on this issue as manifested by its January 8, 2007, Ruling when it
stated the following: "It would appear that the Plaintiff is seeking to regain exclusive
possession of the subject property, yet the Plaintiff has failed to join at least one
seemingly necessary party." (R. 587) The trial court further stated in its February 1, 2007,
Ruling the following: "At least one of these parties has entered into a lease agreement
with the Plaintiff. It would be wholly improper to issue an order restoring possession to
the Plaintiff in possible contravention of the rights and obligations flowing from the
lease." (R. 598) Also, in its February 1, 2007, Ruling, the trial court stated the following:
"[T]he Court will not enter an order of restitution of the subject property until the rights
of all tenants have been adjudicated by process of law." (R. 598) However, the trial court
ultimately erred when it allowed the case to proceed to final judgment, determining that
the Defendant is in unlawful detainer, without determining the rights of possession of
PRS Inc., and how PRS Inc.'s right of possession impacts Defendant's right of
possession, all of which require the joinder of PRS Inc., under Rule 19.
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An interpretation of U.C.A. §78-36-7 that allows for the an unlawful detainer
action to proceed to summary judgment without an evaluation of the rights of possession
of other occupying persons and the impact of such rights upon the party defendant would
allow a prospective plaintiff to analyze the strength of the claims of those occupying the
property and then bring suit only against the one with the weakest claim, thus in many
cases avoiding a just result. Essentially that is the process which has occurred in the case
at hand. Plaintiff elected to proceed against a subtenant rather than the tenant as it knew
only tenant, PRS Inc., had a written lease. When the Defendant sought to introduce the
lease as evidence of an issue of material fact, Plaintiff simply asserted that the lease is
irrelevant as the Defendant is not a party to the lease.
Aside from being unjust, this approach is problematic from a constitutional point
of view. The trial court recognized a possible deprivation of constitutional rights when it
ruled it would "not enter an order of restitution of the subject party until the rights of all
tenants have been adjudicated by process of law." (R. 598). Plaintiffs suggested
approach to U.C.A. §78-36-7 would potentially deprive PRS Inc. of a valuable 50-year
lease and evict it from its leasehold, which would constitute a deprivation of a significant
property right, without ever making PRS Inc. a party to any litigation. Surely this is not
the result that the legislature sough to accomplish with the enactment of U.C.A. §78-36-7.
Plaintiff should be required to at least join those occupying the premises (PRS Inc.) at the
time the action is initiated and the trial court should have at least evaluated the right of
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possession of PRS Inc. and the impact of such right upon the Defendant's right of
possession before ruling in Plaintiffs favor on summary judgment.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DESPITE MATERIAL FACTS
CONCERNING WHETHER PLAINTIFF HAD CONVEYED HIS RIGHT TO
POSSESSION.
The Defendant has continually asserted that the property in question is leased to

PRS Inc. and that PRS Inc. is the only party having the authority to speak to Defendant's
tenancy. To this end the Defendant submitted the lease agreement signed by the landlord
leasing said property. (R. 192-195; R. 270-279) The Defendant has submitted an affidavit
of PRS Inc.'s presiding officer attesting to the fact that PRS Inc. acquiesced to the
tenancy of the Defendant. (R. 384-385).
It is not the purpose of summary judgement to judge the credibility of averments of
the parties or to weigh the evidence. Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283
(Utah Ct. App. 1996). The court is to consider the evidence in a light most favorable to
the non-moving party. Additionally, the summary judgement rule permits excursions
even beyond the pleading. Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Cunningham, 353 P.2d 168
(Utah 1960).
The Defendant believes that its position concerning the rights of a tenant is
supported even at the most basic level by landlord tenant law,. For example, 49 Am Jur
2d states:
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"The right to use leased premises during the term specified in the lease is
transferred from the landlord to the tenant, and during the existence of the lease,
the tenant is the absolute owner of the demised premises for all practical purposes
for the term granted, the landlord's rights being confined to a reversionary
interest" 49 Am Jur 2d § 484.
Am Jur also elaborates on another of the basic tenants of this area of law which is
central to this conflict. More specifically, the issue of who has the right to dictate the
terms of a third party's presence upon the leasehold. The answer to this basic question is
found in 49 Am Jur 2d § 487 in its simplest form. In relevant part the, this publication
restates the law as follows:
"The right of third persons to enter the premises does not depend upon the
landlord, and such entry does not affect any of the landlord's rights, provided they
do not commit a trespass amounting to an injury to the reversion. Accordingly, the
landlord has no right to prevent or prohibit persons from coming on the demised
premises at the invitation of the tenant" 49 Am Jur 2d § 487.

Clearly then, the right to dictate the terms of a third party's presence upon the
leasehold is up to the tenant. The lease agreement is signed by the Plaintiff leasing the
property at issue in this litigation. The Plaintiff does not challenged the validity of the
lease agreement in this action. (R. 2-11; R. 59-63). The Plaintiff did not send PRS Inc.
any notices of default of any of the terms of the lease agreement. (R 872 p. 7). Nor has he
ever challenged the validity of the lease agreement in any other action. Mr. Lauf s
affidavit attests to the fact that tenant corporation has acquiesced to the tenancy of the
Defendant. (R. 382-383).
-17-

Considering these facts in a light most favorable to the Defendant, the trial court's
conclusion should have included an assumption that the property in question is leased to
PRS Inc., and that the Defendant is thus not legally obligated to comply with the
Plaintiffs demand regarding rent payments or regarding vacating the premises.
However, it must be stated that the basis for the trial court's ruling on summary
judgement is somewhat unclear. On first glance, the primary basis for the Court's
granting of Plaintiff s Motion for Summary Judgement appears to be that "the Defendant
has not responded by affidavit." However, this position is at odds with Rule 902(8) of the
Utah Rules of Evidence. Rule 902 Self-Authentication, in relevant part includes:
"(8) Acknowledged Documents. Documents accompanied by a certificate of
acknowledgment executed in the manner provided by law by a notary public or
other officer authorized by law to take acknowledgments."
Utah R. Evid. 902(8).
The 1991 Lease Agreement contains a certificate of acknowledgment, the mark of
the notary public, and was executed by Ray Hunting who is the Plaintiff in this litigation.
The trail court did not offer any legal justification to dismiss the document for lack of
affidavit. Based on the Utah Rules of Evidence, the Court therefore should have
considered the Lease Agreement without an additional affidavit. The Plaintiff, in his
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Reconsider agreed with this
statement of law, but then asserted that the lease agreement was excluded on relevancy
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grounds. (R. 424). The trial court's ruling on the motion made no effort to clarify the
basis for its ruling.
It appears the original November 1, 2007, ruling did, as an afterthought, suggest
that the lease agreement may be irrelevant. However, for the reasons stated above,
defendant submits that the lease agreement is central to the litigation and far from
irrelevant. Evidence that has even the slightest probative value is relevant. State v.
Jaeger, 973 P.2d 404 (Utah 1999). Furthermore, even evidence that is only slightly
probative is "relevant". State v. Martin, 44 P.3d 805 (Utah 2002). Here, the Court is to
determine whether Plaintiff has a legal right to require Defendant to comply with requests
for back rent and to vacate the property. The Lease Agreement goes to the very heart of
these issues and is clearly relevant.
In conclusion, PRS Inc.'s right of possession and the lease agreement are clearly
relevant, were properly presented to the trial court, and constitute issues of material fact
that should have prevented the trial court from ailing in Plaintiffs favor on summary
judgment. The trial court thus erred in so ruling.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT AWARDED PLAINTIFF $88,000.00
INSTEAD OF NOMINAL DAMAGES. SINCE RENT AFTER THE SERVING
OF A THREE-DAY NOTICE IS "DAMAGES" PURSUANT TO THE
UNLAWFUL DETAINER STATUTE.

Even if this Court were to uphold the trial court's decision regarding summary
judgement on the issue of unlawful detainer, the award of $88,174.50 is improper. The
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Defendant notes that the trial court's detemiination that additional rent did not constitute
"damages" is a matter of statutory construction and it should be reviewed for correctness.
Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 661 (Utah 1997) (stating ""Matters of
statutory construction are questions of law that are reviewed for correctness").
As has been set forth supra, Plaintiff has no right to occupancy, and therefore
suffered no actual damage. Thus, nominal damages to vindicate Plaintiffs right to
possession is all that could be properly awarded. Perkins v. Spencer, 243 P.2d 446, 449
(Utah 1952) (stating, "So long as he remained in possession it is difficult to see how the
Spencers could have been damaged....they, therefore, suffered no actual damage"). The
trial court's ruling on damages echoed the holding in Perkins, but nevertheless awarded
$88,174.50, apparently reasoning that rent accruing while one is in unlawful detainer does
not constitute "damages." (R. 817-822). However, Utah case law is clear that after a
termination of tenancy by notice to quit, rent owing thereafter is not rent but "damages."
Forrester v. Cook, 77 Utah 137, 292 P. 206 (1930); Monroe, Inc. v. Sidwell, 770 P.2d
1022 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Quoting Forrester, the court in Sidwell stated, "After the tenancy has been
terminated by the notice required by the statute, the person in unlawful possession is not
owing rent under the contract, but must respond in damages pursuant to the law. Rental
value or reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises becomes an element
of damages for retaining possession. This is not rent, it is damages." Sidwell, 770 P.2d at
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1025. This is consistent with the plain language of the statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-3610(2), which states:
(2) The . . . court. . . shall also assess the damages resulting
to the plaintiff from any of the following:

(d) the amounts due under the contract, if the
alleged unlawful detainer is after default in the
payment of the amounts due under the contract.

The situation at hand is nearly identical to the Perkins case on relevant points.
PRS Inc., among others, remains in possession of the property. PRS, Inc. has received
no notice pursuant to the statute and has not been joined as a party nor has it entered an
appearance in this litigation. PRS, Inc. and other subtenants have not been found to be in
unlawful detainer. Therefore, pursuant to well established case law Plaintiff has
"suffered no actual damage." Perkins, 243 P.2d at 449.
Section 78-36-10(1) of the Utah Code presupposes that the Plaintiff has joined the
proper parties and is entitled to "an order for the restitution of the premises." Utah Code
Ann. § 78-36-10(1) (2007, as amended). Defendant submits that it is for this reason that
Utah case law states that if the object of the action is to recover possession or use of
property, then parties who are in possession and claim an interest in the property are
necessary and indispensable parties to the action. Bonneville Tower Condominium
Management Committee v. Thompson Michie Associates, Inc., 728 P.2d 1017 (Utah
1986).
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Damages for unlawful detainer are based on a plaintiffs right to the benefit and
use of the property in question. It is true that Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10(1) sets forth
that a proper judgment on this issue "include an order for the restitution of the premises."
Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10(1), which the trial court did not do in this case. Defendant
submits that it was proper for the trial court to not order restitution since that remedy is
predicated on the Plaintiff following the proper procedures which includes joining
necessary parties. The Plaintiff did not fulfill his obligations under Rule 19 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Court therefore properly ruled that it would "not enter
an order of restitution of the subject party until the rights of all tenants have been
adjudicated by process of law." (R. 598).
In conclusion, assuming the trial court was correct in its granting of summary
judgment on the issue of unlawful detainer, it nevertheless erred in determining that
unpaid rent accruing after unlawful detainer is not damages in light of the statutory
provisions and that anything other than nominal damages should be awarded in light of
the fact that Plaintiff, after a favorable ruling on unlawful detainer, was still not entitled
to possession of the premises and was thus not entitled to elicit rent payments from
anyone other than the tenant PRS, Inc. who is not a party to this litigation.
CONCLUSION
In light of the fact that a third-party tenant (PRS Inc.) was at the time of the filing
of this action and for twenty plus years prior thereto, and still is, in possession of the
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premises, by reason of and pursuant to a written lease agreement with the Plaintiff, the
trial court erred by allowing the case to proceed to final judgment and by determining that
the Defendant was in unlawful detainer, without finding that PRS Inc. should be joined as
an indispensable party in order to determine PRS Inc.'s right of possession, and how PRS
Inc.'s right of possession impacts Defendant's right of possession. The trial court further
erred when it failed to consider PRS Inc.'s right of possession and the lease agreement
between Plaintiff and PRS Inc. as relevant material facts that should have prevented a
ruling in favor of the Plaintiff on Plaintiffs summary judgment motion. Finally, if the
trial court was correct in its granting of summary judgment on the issue of unlawful
detainer, it nevertheless erred in determining that unpaid rent accruing after unlawful
detainer is not damages and that anything other than nominal damages should be awarded
to the Plaintiff, since the Plaintiff, after an award of summary judgment, is still not
entitled to possession of the premises based on PRS Inc.'s right of possession.
Wherefore, the Defendant respectfully requests that the Utah Court of Appeals reverse the
trial court's granting of summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and remand the matter back
to the trial court, instructing the trial court to consider Defendant's right of possession in light of
the lease agreement and PRS Inc.'s right of possession thereunder, instructing the trial to require
Plaintiff to join PRS Inc. as an indispensable party, and reversing the trial court's determination
that Plaintiff is entitled to judgment in the amount of $88,174.50.
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is lo
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ADDENDUM A

AGREEMENT OF LEASE

THIS
LEASE, dated the
19th day
of December,
1991, is
by and
between Ray Hunting and Marilyn Hunting,
hereinafter called "Owner",
and Pipe Renewal Service, Inc., hereinafter called "Tenant".

owner

W H EI••< E A S , t h e T e n a n t h a s b e e n
l e a s i n g <::: e r t a i n p r e m i B e s f r o m t h e
w h i c h i n c l u d e d r e a l e s t a t e a n d a s h e l l of a m e t a l b u i l d i n g s a n d

WHEREAS,
Tenant h a s m a d e
improvements,
installed
equipment,
electrical s y s t e m s and m a d e
modifications to the buildings
thereon;

WHEREAS,
wri ti ngsj

the

parties

desire

to

reduce

their

agreement

to

NOW T H E R E F O R E , t h e p a r t i e s a g r e e as followsa
1-

FT<EMI§ES

Owner hereby
l e a s e s t o T e n a n t , and
Tenant hereby
l e a s e s from
O w n e r , upon t h e terms and c o n d i t i o n s h e r e i n set f o r t h ,
t h o s e certain
premi B O B 1oeated in Uintah C o u n t y , Utah
descri bed a s fol1owss
The West 37 r o d s
of t h e West 1/2
of t h e S o u t h w e s t 1/4 of
Section 1 4 , T 5 S , R 2 2 E , SLB8<M, South of H i g h w a y 4 0 d e s c r i b e d
arc follows:
Beginning
at
a point
located on
the
West
BBc t i on 1 i n e
wh er e
t h e Sout h
r i g h t ••-- o f - way
1 i n e of
U• S Highway 4 0
i n t e r s e c t s t h e said West section line 1016 feet
more
or
less South
of the West 1/4
comer
of
t h e said
s ec t i on 5
t h e n c e £J o u t h 6 0 d e g r e e s 4 1 ' E a s t a 1 o n g t h e s a i d
S o u t h r i g h t-of way
1 i ne U» S„ Hi ghway
40 700 f eet
more or
1e ss t o
a poi nt
1oe ated
37 r ods
Ea st o f the
Sou t hwest
corner
of
the said
section; thence
West along the
South
B e <::; t i o 1 \ 1 i n e 3 7
rads to the
Sou t \ n we s t e or n er o f
t he sa i d
section; thence north along the West section line 1624 feet
more
or less
to the point
of beginning,
containing 20*5
a <:: r e s m o r e o r 1 e s s«
Together
with all b u i l d i n g s
11 a r e 1 n c a 11 e d '' P r e m i s e s " -

thereon,.

The

area

so

leased

is

REN
Tenant '.shall
pay Owner
rent
in t h e amount of
$2,000.00
per
m o n t h , with
each payment being
d u e on t h e first day of
each month
during t h e term of t h i s a g r e e m e n t .
At t h e Bnd of each third y e a r , or
a 1: t h e c h a n g e
p f P i p e I•<
' e n e w a 1 S e r vice 0 w n e r s h 1 p , d u r i n g t h e lease
terms, the parties
will meet and d i s c u s s
whether t h e r e should
be a
c h a n g e in the amount of rent to b e paid under t h e lease.

3.

IfeUM OF LUIS LEASi.

The term of this lease shall h e for fifty (50) y e a r s , c o m m e n c i n g
with t h e date of this a g r e e m e n t , u n l e s s canceled as provided herein,,
4.

ENTRY AND INBPILiniQN

Owner or its legal representatives shall have
Premi ses hereby leased daring usual business hours
examining
or e>dii bi t i ng the same or to make
a 11 e r a t i o n s o f s a i d P r e m i s e s t h a t 0 w n e r may s e e
3.

free access t o t h e
for the p u r p o s e of
needed r e p a i r s or
fit t o m a k e •

DANAGE OR DESjmJEIIQN BYJFJLBE OR (TITIER CABUALIY

If t h e Premises shall be destroyed or rendered u n t e n a n t a b l e ,
either wholly or in p a r t , by fire or other unavoidable c a s u a l t y ,
Owner m a y , at its o p t i o n , restore the Premises to its p r e v i o u s
c o n d i t i o n , and in the m e a n t i m e , the rent shall be abated in t h e same
preportion as the ui11enantable porti on or the Premi ses b e a r s to t h e
whole thereof; but. unless O w n e r , within thirty (30) days after- the
happening of any such casualty, shall notify Tenant of its election
to so restore
said P r e m i s e s , this lease shal 1 thereupon terminate and
en(.1; pr ovi ded however 'I"enant may cani:::el t h i s lease un 1 e s s the
Premises can be made ten an table within sixty
(60) days of such
casualty.,
6-

AQEiBEitLS AND INmLllNllY.

fiXJEfclObli

Tenant shall defend and indemnify Owner and save them h a r m l e s s
from and against any and all l i a b i l i t y , d a m a g e s , costs or e x p e n s e s ,
including a t t o r n e y s ' fees, on account of injuries to t h e p e r s o n or
property of Owner or any other tenant or other person r i g h t f u l l y on
t h e P r e m :i. s e s i f s u<::: h :i. n j u r i e s a r e e a u s e d b y t h e n e g 1 i g e n c e
misconduct of T e n a n t , or i t s o f f i c e r s , a g e n t s , s e r v a n t s , or e m p l o y e e s
in or- about t h e I"'romi. ses7.

or

NQ WAIVER

I f 0 w n e r a c c o p t B p a y m e n t f r" o m T e n a 1it o n t h i s c o n tr a c 1 i n a n
amoun t 1 es«•;> I:hai) or at a time 1 ater than herei n provi (:Jed , such
acc ep t anc e w:i 11 no t c on st i t u t e a mod i f i cat i on of 1h i s <::: on t r ac t or a
waiver of O w n e r ' s r i g h t s t o full and timely future p e r f o r m a n c e by
Tenant„
EL

Q f i V E N M I A0.A.I.NSI LIENS

0 w n e i" s <::: o v e n ant t o keep t h e P r e m i s e s f r e e a n d c lea r o f all lie n s
and encumbrances resulting from acts of Owners- Owners agree to keep
cur rent the payments on all obligations to which Tenant 's interest is
subor <li na te. EJhoul d Owner def aul t on the f oregoi ng covenants on any
one or more occasions, Tenant m a y , at Tenant's option, in w h o l e of in
pai" t , make good 0wner s ' de f au 11 to 0wner ' s ob 1 i <::iee and dedu<::• t A ! I

credit nil. Tenants' siiums so expended to the rent herein required just
as if payment had been made directly to OwnerB under
the provisions
of paragraph 2 above.
9-

IAXES AND ABSESSMENIS

Owner
agree«3 to pay all
ta>ies and
assessments of
every kind
which become due on the Premises during the term of this agreement.
10.

NO WABJi.

Tenant
agrees that Tenant
will
not commit
or suffer
to be
committed
any waste, spoil or destruction
in or upon the Premises
whi eh would
i mpai r Owners' securi ty , and that Tenant
wi11 mai ntai n
the

Pr em i se &

i n g ood

o on d i t i on

t a Ic i ng i n t o

ac c oun t

t h e bu si nes s

conducted on the Premises by the Tenant.
11 -

DEF AUL;;[ AND REzEN.IRY

If Tenant fails to pay any installment of rent within ten (10)
days after written
notice, or to perform any other covenant under
this lease within
thirty (30) days after written notice form Owner
stating the nature of the default, Owner
may cancel this lease and
re enter and take possession of Premi ses uslnq al1 necessary force to
do so.
In the event of default
by Tenant's non-payment of rent,
"I" e n a n t a g r e <:;:• s t o
p a y i n t er e s t a t t h e r ate o f
e i g h tee n p e r c e n t (18 %)
p e i" a n n u m
o n 11 t e
unp ai d
amoun t p 1 u s
a r e a son ab I e
a 11 o r n e y ' s
fee
i ncurred i n c o n n e c t ! on wi th t h e e n f o r c e m e n t of the provi si oris of the
t e r m s of .this contract.. H o w e v e r , if t h e n a t u r e of such d e f a u l t other
than for I'lon payment
of- rent is such that t h e s a m e cannot r e a s o n a b l y
be cured within such t h i r t y day p e r i o d , Tenant shall not b e deemed to
b e i n 11 e f a u 1 t i f I e n a n t s h a l l * w i t h i n s u e h t i m e p e i" i o d , c o m m e n c e s u e h
c u r e and, thereafter
di 1 igently p r o s e c u t e t h e
same to c o m p l e t i o n .
Buch retaki ng o( p o s s e s s i o n by Owner shalI c o n s t i t u t e cancel I at ion of
thi s a g r e e m e n t .
12.

Hi J i!;:l T JO I^ANCE L

tenant h a s the
r i g h t t o cancel
t h i s a g r e e m e n t at any
t i m e for
any
r e a s o n , upon
giving w r i t t e n
n o t i c e to the
Owner.
The notice
shall set forth the date., not less than o n e h u n d r e d twenty d a y s (120)
from the d a t e of the n o t i c e , on which Tenant will h a v e removed itself
and its e q u i p m e n t from
the p r e m i s e s . At
that d a t e the Tenant
will
h a v e removed
itself
and
its
equipment, fixtures etc.
from
the
pre/iii ses and this a g r e e m e n t shall end.

*3-

BIM D V A L Q£ ifiUi£!l^i

Upon cancel 1 ation
of thi s agreement
or upon the completi on of
the Lease term, the tenant shall
be entitled
to remove everything
that it has installed or placed on the Premises which include, but is
not 1imi ted to, al1 fixtures, racks, machinery, supplies, inventory,
equipment, electrical systems, and double wide mobile home used as ^n

of (: i <:;e„
TpDari I: w:i 11 1 oave the bui 1 d:i. nqs as constructed and 1 eased to
Ten an t, r easonab 1 f
•
:
? wear and t.ear and mod i f :i, c. at i oi>s e« eep t ed„
1^-

yOBTG AND ^VJ:IDRNEY M :S FEES

Bat h p ar k i e s
a q r e e t h a t , s h o u 1 d e :i. t h e r p a r t y
d e f a u 11 i n a n y o f
the
covnnnii t s or a g r e e m e n t s
herei n cnntai n^d , t h e defaul t :i. ng p a r t y
shal 1 pay al 1
c o s t s and e x p e n s e s , i n c l u d i n g a r e a s o n a b l e a t t o r n e y ' B
fee,
which may a r i s e or a c c r u e
from e n f o r c i n g
or t e r m i n a t i n g t h i s
c o n t r a c t , or i n obt ai ning p o s s e s s ! o n of t h e Pr emi s e s , or
i n pursui ng
an y r emed y
p r ov i d ed
h er e u n d er or
b y a p p 1 i c a b 1 e law, wh e t h er
suc h
»••• e m e ci y :i. s p u i- s u e d l;;> y f :i. 1 :i. n g s u i t o r o t h e r w i s e •

IS-

ilillJii

&Brj£gJ3£tiI

I h i s c o n 11- a c t e o n t a i n s t h e e n t i r e a q r e e m e n t b e t w e e n t h e p a r t i e s
heretoAny provi si o n s hereof not en f o r e e a b l e under t h e 1 a w s of t h e
S t a t e of Utah shall
not a f f e c t t h e v a l i d i t y of other
provisions
hereof.

1 &-

B .INfilt10 EFFECI

T11 :i. s a q r e e u i e n t s h a 1 1
s 1i c c e s s o r s a n d a s s i q n s *

be

bi ndi ng

on

the

p ar t i es '

h e i r s,

OWNER:

^•fe£

Mar i1yn ^Hunt ing

:t a m L a u f , / W e s i d e n t, P R S

In - t h e county of U i n t a h , Stat©
of U t a h ,
on t h i s 19th day of
D e c e m b e r , 199:1. ,before m e t h e u n d e r s i g n e d n o t a r y , p e r s o n a l l y a p p e a r e d
Ray
Hunting, Marilyn
H u n t i n g and W i l l i a m L a u f ,
w h o is
personally
known by mo to b e t h e p e r s o n s w h o s e n a m e s are signed on t h e p r e c e d i n g
d o c u m e n t , and a c k n o w l e d g e d
t o m e that
h e / s h e signed it
voluntarily
for i t s stated p u r p o s e .

:*J

Ai

SUE BRUCKNER
Notary Public
STArE OF UTAH

hi Mv Commission Explro-

Not ar y s i g n a t u r e a n d se a 1

ADDENDUM B

ADDENDUM B
UTAH R. CIV. P. RULE 19

Rule 19. Joinder of persons needed for just adjudication.
(a) Persons to be joined if feasible. A person who is subject to service of process
and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of
action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot
be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the
subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence
may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii)
leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double,
multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If he has
not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party. If he should join as a
plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an
involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue and his joinder would render the
venue of the action improper, he shall be dismissed from the action.
(b) Determination by court whenever joinder not feasible. If a person as described
in Subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether
in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or
should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors
to be considered by the court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the
person's absence might be prejudicial to him or those already parties; second, the extent to
which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other
measure, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in
the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate
remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
(c) Pleading reasons for nonjoinder. A pleading asserting a claim for relief shall
state the names, if known to the pleader, of any persons as described in Subdivision
(a)(l)-(2) hereof who are not joined, and the reasons why they are not joined.
(d) Exception of class actions. This rule is subject to the provisions of Rule 23.

ADDENDUM C

ADDENDUM C
UTAH CODE ANN.

78-36-7.
(1)

(2)

(3)

§ 78-36-7

Necessary parties defendant.
No person other than the tenant of the premises, a lease signer, and
subtenant if there is one in the actual occupation of the premises when the
action is commenced, shall be made a party defendant in the proceeding,
except as provided in Section 78-38-13, nor shall any proceeding abate, nor
the plaintiff be nonsuited, for the nonjoinder of any person who might have
been made a party defendant; but when it appears that any of the parties
served with process or appearing in the proceedings are guilty, judgment
shall be rendered against those parties.
If a person has become subtenant of the premises in controversy after the
service of any notice as provided in this chapter, the fact that such notice
was not served on the subtenant is not a defense to the action. All persons
who enter under the tenant after the commencement of the action shall be
bound by the judgment the same as if they had been made parties to the
action.
A landlord, owner, or designated agent is a necessary party defendant only
in an abatement by eviction action for an unlawful drug house as provided
in Section 78-38-13.

ADDENDUM D

ADDENDUM D
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-36-10

78-36-10. Judgment for restitution, damages, and rent — Immediate enforcement
Treble damages.

(1)

(a) A judgment may be entered upon the merits or upon default.
(b) A judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff shall include an order for
the restitution of the premises as provided in Section 78-36-10.5.
(c) If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after neglect or failure to
perform any condition or covenant of the lease or agreement under which
the property is held, or after default in the payment of rent, the judgment
shall also declare the forfeiture of the lease or agreement.
(d)
(i) A forfeiture under Subsection (l)(c) does not release a defendant
from any obligation for payments on a lease for the remainder of the
lease's term.
(ii) Subsection (l)(d)(i) does not change any obligation on either
party to mitigate damages.
(2) The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tried without a jury or upon the
defendant's default, shall also assess the damages resulting to the plaintiff from any of the
following:
(a) forcible entry;
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer;
(c) waste of the premises during the defendant's tenancy, if waste is alleged
in the complaint and proved at trial;
(d) the amounts due under the contract, if the alleged unlawful detainer is
after default in the payment of amounts due under the contract; and
(e) the abatement of the nuisance by eviction as provided in Sections
78-38-9 through 78-38-16.
(3) The judgment shall be entered against the defendant for the rent, for three times
the amount of the damages assessed under Subsections (2)(a) through (2) (e), and for
reasonable attorney fees.
(4)
(a) If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer, execution upon the judgment
shall be issued immediately after the entry of the judgment.
(b) In all cases, the judgment may be issued and enforced immediately.

ADDENDUM E

IN THE EIC7HTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RAY HUNTING,
RULING AND ORDER
Plaintiff,
vs .
Case No. 050800484
PIPE RENEWAL SERVICE, LLC, a
limited liability company,

Judge JOHN R. ANDERSON

Defendant.

This matter is before the Court on the following motions:
1) Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed September 2 2 , 2006,
and accompanied by supporting memorandum and affidavit.
Defendant's
opposition was filed October 10, 2006.
Plaintiff's reply was filed
October 19, 2006. Notice to submit the motion for decision was filed
October 20, 2006.
2) Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6) U.R.C.P.,
filed September 25, 2006, and accompanied by supporting memorandum.
Plaintiff's opposition was filed October 10, 2006.
Defendant's reply
was filed October 19, 2006. Notice to submit the motion for decision
was filed October 30, 2006.
The Court has reviewed the motions and their respective
memoranda. Having considered the matter, and having received notice
to submit the motions for decision, the Court now rules upon the
motions.
For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the
Plaintiff's motion, but will reserve the issue of damages pending a
hearing on that issue. The Defendant's motion will be denied.
I. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in relevant part, siate,
[w]hen a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by

affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Utah
R. Civ. P. Rule 56(e). The Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment
was accompanied by affidavit and deposition citations setting forward
specific facts upon which the Court could find summary judgment
appropriate. The Defendant has not responded by affidavit or
established specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial. Rather, it appears to the Court that the Defendant has based
its entire defense on a lease agreement entered into by the Plaintiff
and a non-party entity, Pipe Renewal Service, Inc. Where a party
fails to set forth facts showing a genuine issue of material fact,
w
Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party
failing to file such a response." Id. Therefore, the Court's
attention turns to whether summary judgment is appropriate.
As pointed out by the Plaintiff in his reply memorandum in
support of the motion for summary judgment, the Defendant has not
disputed that the Plaintiff served the Defendant both 1) a notice of
rent increase and 2) a notice to vacate after the Defendant had failed
to pay the increased amount of rent. Rather, the Defendant argues
that notices were received, but that such notice constitutes a breach
of the lease agreement between the Plaintiff and Pipe Renewal Service,
Inc., a non-party to this lawsuit. The Defendant has not offered any
evidence to support the fact that the Defendant, Pipe Renewal Service,
LLC, is bound by the terms of that lease agreement or that the
Plaintiff is obligated to deal with Pipe Renewal Service, LLC, m the
same way that the Plaintiff is required to deal with Pipe Renewal
Service, Inc. The Court, having reviewed the record, is of the
opinion that the lease agreement, as it has been submitted in regard
to the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, is irrelevant. The
Defendant is not party L O thai contract and the Plaintiff is not
obligated to deal with the Defendant based upon the terms expressed
therein. Without the lease agreement argument to fall back on, the
Defendant has done nothing to contest the Plaintiff's right to summary
judgment or to create a genuine issue of material fact.
The Court is convinced by the argument and the citations to Utah
law that the Plaintiff is entitled to unilaterally raise rents when
the landlord and tenant have failed to memorialize the lease in
writing. In such an instance, the lease is month-ro-month. If the
Defendant was concerned about a unilateral rent increase, the
Defendant could have negotiated with the Plaintiff and sought to
reduce the lease agreement to writing. The Court has noi been
presented with any evidence indicating that the Plaintiff is not
legally entitled to unilaterally increase rent in this case. Because

the Court finds that the Plaintiff is entitled to increase rent, and
because the Defendant concedes receiving notice of the rent increase
and failing to pay the increased amount, and because the Plaintiff
served the Defendant with a notice to vacate, and because the
Defendant did not pay the increased rent and did not vacate, the Court
can lawfully conclude that the Defendant is in unlawful detainer of
the subject property. Therefore, the Court will grant the Plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment. However, the Court is concerned with the
amount of damages as calculated by the Plaintiff. Therefore, the
Court will order that a hearing be held on the issue of damages.
II.

THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

By granting the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, the
Court has implicitly denied the Defendant's motion to dismiss. The
Plaintiff and the Defendant correctly point out that "If, on a motion
for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are
presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in
Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56."
Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 12(c). Here, the Court will exclude the lease
agreement, and will treat the motion as a motion to dismiss. The
Court finds that the Plaintiff has not ia iled to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. Even if the Court were not to exclude
the lease agreement, the Court would find the lease agreement to be
irrelevant as to the parties to this suit. Therefore, whether the
motion is treated as a motion to dismiss or as a motion for summary
judgment, the Defendant's argument ultimately fails. Simply put, the
Plaintiff has not failed to state a claim and nothing in the record
creates a genuine issue of material fact.
ORDER
Therefore, based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, the
Defendant's motion to dismiss is DENIED, and the matter will be set
for hearing on the issue of damages.
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
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RAY HUNTING,
RULING
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 050800484
JUDGE JOHN R. ANDERSON

vs.
PIPE RENEWAL SERVICE, L.L.C.,
Defendant.

This matter is before the Court on the following motions:
1) Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Judgment on Order Regarding
Attorney's Fees Awarded Pursuant to Court Ruling and Order Dated
October 17, 2006, filed May 03, 2007; 2) Plaintiff's Motion to
Award Damages and for Entry of Final Judgment, filed May 03,
2007; 3) Defendant's Motion to Strike Hunting Affidavit, filed
May 17, 2007; 4) Defendant's Motion to Strike Dyer Affidavit,
filed May 17, 2007.
I. Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Judgment on Order Regarding
Attorney's Fees Awarded Pursuant to Court Ruling and Order Dated
October 17, 2006
It appears to the Court, from a review of the record, that
the October 17, 2006 order of the Court awarding the Plaintiff
$1,000.00 as attorney fees has already been observed. On June
18, 2007, the Defendant filed a Satisfaction of Judgment Regarding Attorney Fees which states that the $1,000.00 award has been
M
fully paid, satisfied and discharged by check number 5152."
Therefore, the Plaintiff's motion on this issue is now mooted.

II. Plaintiff's Motion to Award Damages and for Entry of Final
Judgment
The Plaintiff's motion requests an order awarding the
Plaintiff the following:
a) $88,000.00 for unpaid rent from September 2005 through
December 2006;
b) "$264,000.00 as treble damages based upon Defendant's unlawful detainer of the subject property;
c) $174.50 for costs and court fees; and
d) final judgment based upon the aforementioned amounts.
Based upon the prior rulings of the Court, it is clear that
the Plaintiff is entitled to the $88,000.00 for unpaid rent.
The Court has previously found that: 1) these parties did not
have a written lease; 2) that the Plaintiff was entitled to unilaterally increase the Defendant's rent as part of the resulting
month-to-month tenancy; 3) that the Defendant was aware of the
rent increase; 4) that the Defendant received a notice to pay or
vacate; 5) that the Defendant did not pay the increased amount
of rent, but continued paying only $2,000.00 per month; and 6)
that by not paying the increased amount and not vacating the Defendant was in unlawful detainer of the property. The increased
rent amount went into effect in September 2005. It appears that
the Defendant has vacated the property as of December 2006. As
a result, the Defendant failed to pay the increased amount of
rent for 16 months. Sixteen (16) months at $5,500.00 per month
(the difference between what the Plaintiff expected, $7,500.00
per month, and what the Defendant actually paid, $2,000.00 per
month) results in $88,000.00 of unpaid rent. Therefore, based
upon the foregoing, the Court hereby awards the Plaintiff
$88,000.00 for unpaid rent.
The more difficult question is whether the Plaintiff is entitled to the requested $264,000.00 as treble damages for the
Defendant's unlawful detainer. First, there is no question that
even if the Defendant had vacated the premises after receiving
the Plaintiff's three-day notice to pay or vacate (or any time

thereafter, for that matter), this Court would not have been in
a position to restore possession of the subject property to the
Plaintiff. The fact of the matter is that another party, PRS,
Inc.,1 was still arguably in possession of the premises or had
legal right to the premises based upon a lease between the Corporation and the Plaintiff. The rights and obligations of the
parties to that lease agreement have never been brought before
this Court for adjudication and the Court currently lacks jurisdiction to render a decision on those issues. It is for these
reason that the Court twice declined to issue an order of restitution or the subject property to the Plaintiff in this case,
even after the Defendant was found to be in unlawful detainer of
the subject property.
The Plaintiff urges the Court to presume that PRS, Inc. had
abandoned the lease. See Plaintiff's Reply in Supp. of Mot. to
Award Damages 6 n.10 and 7 n.15. Plaintiff then states that
"Plaintiff is not asking this Court to adjudicate the rights of
PRS Corporation . . . " I_d. at 8. The Court will not presume
that PRS, Inc. abandoned the lease without having PRS, Inc. as a
party to the suit. Therefore, the presumption of abandonment
will not be entertained, or relied upon, by the Court.
Instead, the Court will hold to the position it has taken
previously in this case. Even if PRS, LLC had vacated the premises, the Plaintiff would have been unable to retake possession
of the subject property until lawfully dealing with PRS, Inc.'s
alleged rights under the lease. Because the Plaintiff would
have had no right to possession of the property, the Court cannot see how the Plaintiff was damaged beyond not receiving the
increased rental amount. On this point, the Court is persuaded
by Perkins v. Spencer, 243 P.2d 446 (Utah 1952), which (contrary
to the Plaintiff's reply memorandum at 8) very clearly addresses
the issue of whether treble damages for unlawful detainer are
appropriate when a non-party to the suit enjoys possession of
the subject property. While the cases are distinguishable on
some factual points, the fact of the matter remains that

1

The Court is aware that PRS, Inc.'s name has subsequently changed, but will
continue to refer to the corporation which was party to the lease as PRS,
Inc., as stated in the lease.

so long as [PRS, Inc.] remained in possession, it is difficult to see how [Mr. Hunting] could be damaged by that fact
that [PRS, LLC] remained there. Even if [the LLC] had
moved, [Mr. Hunting] would have had no right to possession
of the premises as against [the Corporation]. [Mr. Hunting], therefore, suffered no actual damage.
See i_d. at 449. Therefore, on this basis, the Court hereby denies Plaintiff's request for any treble damages in this matter.
On this issue of costs and court fees, the Court will award
$174.50 to the Plaintiff as the prevailing party.
III. Defendant's Motions to Strike
A. The May 02, 2007 Hunting Affidavit
The Court has reviewed the Defendant's motion as it relates
to the May 02, 2007 Hunting affidavit and will grant the motion
as follows. The Court hereby strikes: 1) paragraphs four in its
entirety; and 2) paragraph five in its entirety. The Court
strikes these provisions on the ground that they contain legal
argument or opinion which exceeds the permissible scope of an
affidavit. If the Plaintiff believes there are facts contained
within those paragraphs which should be brought before the
Court, Plaintiff is instructed to submit a new affidavit limited
only to facts, and not containing conclusion, argument, or opinion.
B. The May 02, 2007 Dyer Affidavit
The Court has reviewed the Defendant's motion as it relates
to the May 02, 2007 Dyer affidavit and will grant the motion as
follows. The Court hereby strikes: 1) paragraphs three in its
entirety; 2) paragraph four in its entirety; and 3) the final
sentence of paragraph six. If the Plaintiff feels there are
facts contained within those paragraphs which should be brought
before the Court, Plaintiff is instructed to submit a new affidavit limited to facts, and not containing conclusion, argument,
or opinion.

ORDER
Therefore, based upon the foregoing, the Court hereby orders that:
1) Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment-on Attorney Fees is MOOT;
2) Plaintiff's Motion for Award of Damages is GRANTED IN PAiRT,
as follows:
a) the Plaintiff is awarded $88,000.00 as unpaid rent;
b) the Plaintiff is awarded $0.00 as treble damages; and
c) the Plaintiff is awarded $174.50 as costs; and
3) Defendant's Motions to Strike are GRANTED IN PART, as outlined in the Court's ruling.
The Court hereby orders the Plaintiff to prepare an order
of final judgment based upon this ruling and order, and to submit it to the Court for signature per the procedures outlined in
Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Dated this

V

day of

2007.

BY THE COURT

OHN R. ANDERSON, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RAY HUNTING,
RULING AND ORDER
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 050800484
JUDGE JOHN R. ANDERSON

vs .
PIPE RENEWAL SERVICE, L.L.C.,
Defendant.

This matter is before the Court on Defendant's motion for
reconsideration, filed November 14, 2006.
The matter came b e fore the Court for oral argument on the motion on January 30,
2007.
At that hearing the Court considered: 1) the merits of
the motion to reconsider; 2) the prospective application of the
Court's earlier October 17, 2006 order regarding discovery; 3)
the reasonableness of Plaintiff's attorney fees as they relate
to Plaintiff's earlier motion to compel; and 4) the joinder of
other interested parties to this lawsuit. At the conclusion of
the hearing, the Court ruled from the bench on the issues.
Having given the matter further consideration, the Court decided to
issue a written ruling instead. .Therefore, having reviewed the
motion and memoranda submitted to the Court, and having considered the arguments of the parties as presented at the hearing,
the Court now rules as follows.
I. DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
The Court will deny the Defendant's motion for reconsideration. After entertaining oral argument on the issue, the Court
is unconvinced that the order granting Plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment should be set aside. The Court's previous ruling and order will therefore stand unchanged.

DE

That said, the Court understands that by denying the Defendant's motion for consideration, the Plaintiff will want the
Court to enter an order of restitution, restoring the subject
property to the Plaintiff. In a typical eviction case, the
proper course of action would be to issue such an order. However, in this case, there are other parties presently in possession of the subject property whose rights have not yet been adjudicated. At least one of these parties has entered into a
lease agreement with the Plaintiff. It would be wholly improper
for the Court to issue an order restoring possession to the
Plaintiff in possible contravention of rights and obligations
flowing from the lease. Therefore, the Court will deny the Defendant's motion for reconsideration, and puts the Plaintiff on
notice that the Court is unwilling at this time to issue an order of restitution.
II. PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF OCTOBER 17, 2006 ORDER
On October 17,2006, the Court issued an order allowing additional discovery in the matter. This October 17, 2006 order
was entered prior to the Court granting Plaintiffs motion for
summary judgment. At the January 30, 2007 hearing, the Plaintiff stated that if the motion for summary judgment remained undisturbed, the Plaintiff would not seek to perform the additional discovery contemplated by the October 17, 2006 order.
Because the motion for reconsideration is denied, the order
granting Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is undisturbed.
Therefore, the October 17, 2006 order is no longer necessary and
the Court will therefore set aside that order, to the extent
that it permits additional discovery to be conducted. This ruling also disposes of the Defendant's objections to the discovery
sought by the Plaintiff, filed September 29, 2006, and October
04, 2006.
III. REASONABLENESS OE PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY FEES
The Court awarded attorney fees to the plaintiff for having
to file a motion to compel discovery. Although the Court has
just ruled that the October 17, 2006 order has no prospective
application as far as future discovery is concerned, the Court
will enforce the order as to the award of attorney fees. The

Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit on those fees. The Defendant objected to the reasonableness of the stated fees.
Haviag
considered the matter, the Court will order that the amount
stated in the Plaintiff's affidavit be reduced to $1,000.00.
IV. JOINDER OF THIRD PARTIES
The Court instructed the parties to prepare to address the
issue of joining other seeming necessary parties to this lawsuit. Having review the argument of the parties and the applicable law, the Court is still not convinced that PRS, Inc. is
not a necessary party to this suit, insofar as it appears to the
Court that the Plaintiff desires to re-enter and obtain full
possession of the subject property. In granting Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, the Court had only adjudicated the
rights between Ray Hunting and PRS, LLC. However, as stated
above, an adjudication of those rights does not allow the Court
to restore complete possession of the subject property to the
Plaintiff. It is clear to the Court that there exists a lease
between PRS, Inc. (now PRSM, Inc.) and the Plaintiff. The
rights and obligations that flow from that lease agreement ha\/e
not been adjudicated at this time. It appears that PRSM, Inc.
and PRS Holdings, Inc. have been in possession of the subject
property this entire time. Yet none of those parties have been
brought within the jurisdiction of this Court through service of
process or appearance in the matter.
The Plaintiff spent considerable time at the January 30,
2007 hearing explaining several cases, copies of which were delivered to the Court at the hearing. Having now reviewed those
cases, the Court finds that Tanner v. Lawler, 305 P.2d 882 (Utah
1957) is distinguishable from the present case on numerous
grounds, the most obvious of which is that the alleged owner of
the property (Reichert) was: 1) not in actual possession of the
property; and 2) intervened in the suit therefore submitting to
the jurisdiction of the court. Here, it appears to the Court
that PRS entities (including PRS, LLC; PRSM, Inc.; and PRS Holdings, Inc.) have all enjoyed concurrent possession of the subject property and that only PRS, LLC's rights have been adjudicated at this time, the other parties not having been joined to
the action.

The Court further finds that Pinckney v. Snideman, 2000 UT
App 275, an unpublished decision, is distinguishable on the
grounds that, at the time suit was brought, Snideman was apparently in sole possession of the property in that case. Here,
there is ample reason to believe that PRS, LLC is not the sole
party in possession of the subject property. The fact that PRS,
LLC's name appears on the rent check does not, in and of itself,
make PRS, LLC the only tenant, especially in light of the lease
agreement executed between the Plaintiff and PRS, Inc., which
rights and obligations have not yet been adjudicated.
The Court also considered the case of Pearce v. Shurtz, 270
P.2d 442 (Utah 1954, and concludes that it too is distinguishable from the matter at bar. In Pearce, Call sold a ranch to
Lewellen, who subsequently assigned his interest in a bond for
deed to Shurtz, who assigned half of his interest to Wright.
Lewellen apparently maintained liability on a promissory note.
Shurtz and Wright then collectively assigned their interests to
Johnson. Then Call (the original owner) assigned his interest
in the promissory note for the ranch to Pearce, who then sued
Shurtz, Wright, and Johnson for unlawful detainer. Looking at
the matter in light of those facts, it is not difficult to see
how Pearce is distinguishable from the present action. In every
instance, there was an assignment of rights from one party to
the next. Further, the very language of the case makes it impossible for the Court to rely upon it in the way urged by the
Plaintiff. The Court stated, "Unlawful detainer, however, is an
action to remove a tenant from possession and is primarily
against the person in possession." Because Lewellen was apparently not in possession of the property, it was not required
that Lewellen be joined as a necessary party, and Pearce could
lawfully proceed against Shurtz, Wright, and Johnson (i.e., the
parties in possession). Here, as stated above, the Defendant
and the other PRS entities appear to have enjoyed concurrent
possession of the subject property.
Therefore, the Court concludes as follows. The rights of
PRS, LLC have been adjudicated, the Court finding that PRS, LLC
was lawfully served with an increase in rent. Failing to pay
the increase in rent, the Plaintiff brought suit against the LLC
for unlawful detainer. The Court's order granting Plaintiff's

motion for summary judgment effectively adjudicated the rights
of the Plaintiff against the LLC. However, the rights of the
Plaintiff against the lessee, PRS, Inc. have not been the subject of this Court's attention at this point. Therefore, it
would be improper for this Court to issue an order granting
Plaintiff the right to retake possession of the property until
such time as the rights under the lease have been adjudicated.
Finally, the issue of Plaintiff's damages resulting from
PRS, LLC's unlawful detainer will be reserved for future hearing .
ORDER
Therefore, based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
that Defendant's motion for reconsideration is DENIED; the October 17, 2006 order has no prospective application as to future
discovery, but the Court's award of attorney fees on Plaintiff's
motion to compel survives; the Defendant is ordered to pay
$1,000.00 in attorney fees to Plaintiff; and the Court will not
enter an order of restitution of the subject property until the
rights of all tenants have been adjudicated by process of law.
Dated

this

( • > • < •

day of

?-^-

2007.

BY THE COU

4.A.y^
JOHN R. ANDERSON,

D I S T R I C T COURT JUDGE
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ADDENDUM H

ADDENDUM H
UTAH R. CIV, P. RULE 56

Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or
to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the
adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is
asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for summary
judgment as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in
accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment,
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is
a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not
rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court
at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by
interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without
substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith
controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without
substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are
just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and
the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to
testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof
referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may
permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to

interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations
or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Summary
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file such a response.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party
opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts
essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for
judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to
be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are
presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order
the party presenting them to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses
which the filing of the affidavits caused, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any
offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.

